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Abstract
We study an economy where search frictions create a coordination prob-
lem among agents and thereby generate multiple equilibria. Our interest
is in how likely it is that the economy will …nd its way to each of these
equilibria when agents learn as Bayesians. We show how using learning as
an equilibrium selection device generates a probability distribution over the
set of equilibria, and we study the e¤ect of di¤erent government policies
on this distribution. We show how in our model a tradeo¤ arises – policies
that increase the value of being in a particular equilibrium tend to reduce
the probability of reaching that equilibrium.
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Models with multiple equilibria are often criticized as not being useful for policy analysis because
they fail to assign a unique prediction to each possible policy choice. Rather, each choice leads
to a set of possible outcomes, and this set may be quite large. In some cases it is possible to
make meaningful comparisons of different sets of equilibria and thereby determine an ‘‘optimal’’
policy.
1 However, such cases are clearly the exception and not the rule; set-wise comparisons do
not generally yield unambiguous results. Various criteria have been proposed for selecting one (or
a small set) of the equilibria as ‘‘relevant’’ for the particular issue at hand so that the optimal policy
can be determined relative to that equilibrium.
2 Unfortunately, none of these criteria have proven
completely satisfactory. Onesuchcriterionisstability withrespecttoBayesianlearningaboutsome
aspect(s) of the economic environment.
3 In this approach, agents have some initial beliefs about
the data-generating processes in the economy and update these beliefs based on what they observe
according to Bayes’ rule. As they act on these updated beliefs, more data is generated and they
update their beliefsagain. Under someconditions, the economy will convergetooneof therational
expectationsequilibriaof themodel. One perceivedproblemwiththisapproachisthat it oftendoes
not select a unique equilibrium; the economy may asymptotically approach several equilibria with
positive probability. Our goal in this paper is to demonstrate that this is not a shortcoming of the
learning approach. We show how Bayesian learning generates a probability distribution over the
set of equilibria in a simple example, and we focus on the properties of this distribution. This
distribution provides a different type of answer to the question of what will happen when a policy
changes. Models with a unique equilibrium give a point estimate – if the policy parameter changes
to x; the new equilibrium will be y: Our model will make a probabilistic statement: if the policy
parameter changestox;the possible outcomesare fy1;:::;yng;and equilibriumyi will occur with
probability ¼i: We argue that this is a precise and valuable prediction. We show that the optimal
policy choice resulting from such a view of the model is, in some cases, different from that which
would be derived using any deterministic selection criterion.
Bayesian learning is one element of a broad class of dynamic processes that have been proposed
1 See, for example, Grandmont [5] , Woodford [13] , Smith [12] , and Keister [8] , among others.
2 See Guesnerie and Woodford [6] , section 7, for an introduction to this topic and an extensive list of references.
3 See Blume and Easley [2] for an excellent survey of the literature on Bayesian learning.
1asequilibriumselectionmechanisms. Ouranalysisfocusesentirely onthistypeoflearningbecause
it allows us to present our results in a concise and relatively transparent way, but the basic ideas we
present are in no way tied to this choice. Similarly, the model we employ is highly stylized. Our
goal is to demonstrate the value of probabilistic equilibrium selection in this particular setting, and
in future work to show how the ideas presented here extend to other environments.
In our model, individual agents must decide whether or not to engage in production. Because of
an output-market externality, the value of producing depends on how many other agents produce.
The model is similar in many respects to that of Howitt and McAfee [7] , but our focus is on
search and matching in the output market rather than in the labor market. Our externality generates
a coordination problem in that an individual agent wants to produce if and only if enough other
agentsareproducing. This,inturn,generatesapairofPareto-rankedequilibria,onewhereeveryone
produces (the ‘‘good’’ equilibrium) and the other where no one produces (the ‘‘bad’’ equilibrium).
We use learning to determine the likelihood that the economy will find its way to each of these
equilibria. To address the issue of optimal policy determination, we introduce a government which
is composed of a fraction of the agents in the economy. By determining the production and search
decisionsof theseagents, thegovernment canaffect thevalue to aprivate agent of producing. This,
in turn, affects not only the existence of each of the two equilibria, but also the likelihood of the
economy converging to each of them. We show how the government may face a tradeoff: policies
that increase the value of the good equilibrium to private agents tend to make that equilibrium less
likely. We compute this tradeoff for a numerical example.
The next section contains a detailed description of the model and the policy tools available to
the government. Section 3 presents some properties of equilibrium both with and without active
government policy. It also provides a characterization of optimal allocations in this setting (which
typically differ from equilibrium allocations because of the output-market externality). Section 4
then demonstrates how learning generates a probability distribution over the equilibrium set and
presents some results characterizing this distribution, including the tradeoff that may arise. Finally,
section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
22. The Model
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There is a [0;1] continuum of identical agents and a
single commodity in each period which is produced using only labor. Agents can consume their
own output, but they prefer the output of others.
4 Finding a match in the output market requires
costly effort. Agents who have produced choose a level of search effort, with higher effort leading
to a higher probability of finding a buyer (match). If a buyer is found, the two agents trade output
andconsume; ifnot, theagentconsumesherownoutput. Thereisnocreditandhenceallexchanges
are quid-pro-quo. These assumptions and the perishability of goods imply that the actions of an
agent do not have intertemporal effects and therefore that the only dynamics in our model are with
respect to expectations.
We allow for government policy in this model by assuming that the government is composed
of fixed fraction Ã of the agents in the economy. The actions taken by these agents need not be
utility maximizing; they instead represent the policy of the government.
5 By having all of these
agents produce and then engage in output-market search, the government can increase demand
in the output market, possibly making it more attractive for private agents to produce. We will
consider two types of government policy, which we term passive and active. This is identical to
a model with no government. In a passive policy, government agents simply act as private agents
and maximize their own utility. In an active policy, government agents always produce, and then
search with a common effort level. This effort level is the government’s policy parameter.
2.1 Production
At the beginning of each period, each private agent must decide whether or not to produce. Pro-
duction is a binary decision; it must be operated at a fixed scale or not operated at all. The utility
value of the output when consumed by another agent is given by F: The utility value of consum-
ing one’s own output is ¾F; where ¾ is strictly less than unity. Producing requires labor input that




cL < cH. The probability that c = cL is given by ¹ p; while the expected value of c is given by c:
4 We think of this as a form of specialization in production, as in Diamond [4] .
5 Aiyagari and Wallace [1] , also within a search theoretic environment, model the government participation in the
economy following the same principles used here (however, they are mainly concerned with monetary issues).
3The realization of c is not yet known when the production decision is made. If an agent chooses
not to produce, she does not consume and has zero utility that period (a normalization). We use r
to denote the fraction of all agents that choose to produce.
Before we can study the problem of an agent deciding whether or not to produce, we need to
calculate the benefit of producing. For this we need to look at the workings of the output market.
2.2 Output Market
Asmentionedabove, agentsprefer goodsproducedby otherstothosethatthey producethemselves.
Agentswhohaveproducedhaveanopportunity tosearchforabuyer, andthey mustchooseasearch
intensity ° 2 [0;1):Theprobability ofeachagentfindingamatch,andhencethefractionofagents
finding a match in equilibrium, is given by an aggregate matching function. We first describe the
properties of this function and then analyze the problem faced by an agent in choosing her search
intensity.
TheMatchingFunction: Thefractionof allagentsintheeconomy thatfindamatchisgivenby an
aggregate matching function m:
6 Let ° denote the average level of search intensity in the economy,





(we will obviously have °i = 0 for agents that have not produced). Then the value of m depends
on ° and on the number of agents that are searching r: We assume that m takes the form
m(°;r) = ¹(°)r:
The function ¹ then givesthe number of matches per searching agent asa function of the total level
of search intensity in the market. We assume that ¹ : R+ ! [0;1) is continuous on R+; is C3 on
R++; and satisfies the following conditions
6 Assuming a matching function simplifies matters considerably, but it clearly does not come without cost. In par-
ticular, policy changes may affect the nature of the matching process, and this effect will be absent in our analysis. We
leave the study of this effect for future work. See Lagos[9] for an interesting analysis in this direction.
4(A1) ¹(0) = 0
(A2) ¹0 (x) > 0 for all x > 0
(A3) limx!1 ¹(x) = 1
(A4) limx!0 ¹0 (x) = 0
(A5) ¹(x) < x for all x > 0
(A6) There exists an x > 0 such that
¹00(x) > 0 for 0 < x < x
¹00 (x) < 0 for x < x < 1
(A7) 1 < limx!0 ¹00 (x) > 4a
(1¡¾)F
(A8) ¹000 (x) < 0 for 0 < x < x:
Thefirst assumptionissimply that whennoagentssearch, noonegetsmatched, while thesecondis
that searcheffort isproductive aslong as theaverageintensity intheeconomy ispositive. The third
assumption says that for high enough levels of effort, nearly all searching agents will be matched.
The reasons for the fourth and fifth assumptions follow from the interpretation of ¹ as a proba-
bility facing individual agents. Note that ¹ gives the fraction of searching agents that find a match.
If an individual agent chooses search intensity °i, taking the search intensity of other agents (°) as









so that ½ is the probability of finding a match per unit of search intensity The fourth assumption




so that if no other agents are searching, there is no reason to search for a buyer. The fifth assump-
tion guarantees that the probability ½ is less than one. The final three assumptions are regularity
5conditions that generate a unique interior perfect-foresight equilibrium in the output market.
7 The
previous assumptions imply that ¹ is initially convex and eventually concave. Condition (A6) is
simply that there is an unique point where the second derivative is zero. Condition (A7) states
that the degree of convexity is initially large enough, which guarantees that the average product
of search effort initially increases quickly enough to make positive search effort worthwhile. The
final assumption states that the degree of convexity of ¹ is strictly decreasing up to the changeover
point of the secondderivative, or that the marginal product of search effort is initially concave. The
importance of this condition for generating uniqueness of output-market equilibrium is discussed
in the results below.
Throughout the paper we will present examples and computations that use the function
¹(x) = 1 ¡
1
1 + x2: (1)







Figure 1: A Matching Function




since ¹00(0) for this function is equal to 2:
The Choice of Search Intensity: Agent i chooses a nonnegative search intensity °i: The cost of
7 There will still often be multiple equilibria in the economy as a whole because of the coordination problem in
deciding whether or not to recruit.
6this intensity is convex and given by a°2
i: If an agent meets a buyer, they exchange output. If an
agent does not meet a buyer, she can consume her own output, but the value to her is only ¾F. The
search cost is measured in units of utility. The agent’s output-market problem is to choose °i to

















where the agent takes the value of ½ as given (in equilibrium this will be ½(°;r)). The constraint
says that °i must be chosen so that the implied probability of finding a match is no greater than
one. Equivalently, wecouldchangetheobjectivefunctionsothatif°i ischosentomake½°i greater
than one, then the probability of a match would still be one. Since this would entail a higher search
cost and no benefit, no agent would ever pick ½°i > 1; and the solution to that problem is the same
as the solution to the constrained problem we have written here. The objective function can be
reduced to
¾F + (1 ¡ ¾)½F°i ¡ a°
2
i:
The first-order condition for an interior solution is
(1 ¡ ¾)½F = 2a°i;












Note that we have °¤
i ¸ 0; with °¤
i > 0 as long as ½ is greater than zero. Since the expected benefit
of search effort is linear in ° and the marginal cost of effort is zero when ° is zero, it is optimal to
engage in a positive level of search whenever ½ is positive.
2.3 The Production Decision
With this information about the value of producing, we are now ready to examine the agent’s pro-
duction decision. The value of producing clearly depends on how many other agents will be par-
7ticipating in the output market. Let ¸ denote the (utility) value to an agent of producing. The
agent faces a binary decision problem, and will produce if and only if this value is greater than the
expected cost, that is, if and only if
¸ > c



















of theother agents. We assume that anindividual agent believesthat all other privateagentswill act
identically (that is, weruleoutasymmetricandmixed-strategy equilibria). Hence, intheabsenceof
anactivegovernmentpolicy, aggregateemploymentwillbeeitherzeroorunity. Whenr isexpected



























Specifying a government policy in this environment amounts to specifying a decision rule for pub-
lic agents. A passive policy is the same as a model with no government: all agents maximize their
own utility. We also consider an active policy where all public agents produce and then search with
a common intensity level °G: In choosing the search intensity of public agents, the government
is affecting the probability that searching private agents will find a buyer. We therefore view this
policy asa formof aggregate demand management. Our interest is in (i) comparing the set of equi-
libria under the two policies and (ii) analyzing the optimal-policy question of how the government
8should set °G:
3. Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions for this economy are simply that the decisions made by agents generate
the market conditions that each private agent takes as given. Formally, we have the following
definition.
Definition: An equilibrium with a passive government is a function °¤ : [0;1] ! R giving the




(i) each agent chooses optimally whether or not to produce and sets °¤
i by (3),
(ii) r is equal to the fraction of all agents that choose to produce, and
(iii) ½ = ½(°¤;r) = ¹(°¤)r=°¤:
An equilibrium with an active government is (°¤;r) such that we have
(i) °¤
i = °G for each public agent,
(ii) each private agent chooses optimally whether or not to produce and sets °¤
i by (3),
(iii) r ¸ Ã is equal to the fraction of all agents that choose to produce, and
(iv) ½ = ½(°¤;r) = ¹(°¤)r=°¤:
We first examine the passive regime, and then turn to the analysis of equilibrium with active
government policy.
3.1 Equilibrium with a Passive Government
We begin by showing that the optimal choice of °i is always interior, that is, that the constraint to
problem (2) is never binding in equilibrium.







Proof: See appendix. ¥
Since the agent’s problem has a unique solution and all agents are identical, all agents in the





Substituting this information and the definition of ½ into equation (4), we have that the equilibrium








We now show that our assumptions on ¹ guarantee that there exists a unique nonzero solution to
this equation.
Lemma 2 There exists a unique interior solution for °¤ to equation (5).
Proof: See appendix . ¥
The uniqueness property allows us to fully characterize the comparative-static properties of the
equilibrium search intensity °¤:










Proof: Define f (°;F;a;¾) to be the right-hand side of (5). Then the uniqueness of the solution




must hold. This implies that the sign of the derivative of f with respect to each of the remaining
variables directly determines the sign of the derivative of °¤ with respect to that variable. ¥





; F = 5; ¾ =
1
2
; c = 2:8:
Plotting the left-hand and right-hand sides of (5) separately yields figure 2. The two curves cross











Figure 2: The equilibrium level of °
With a passive government policy, there exist at most two (pure-strategy) equilibria under per-
fect foresight. We follow Howitt and McAfee [7] in calling these equilibria ‘‘optimistic’’ and
‘‘pessimistic.’’ First suppose that each agent believes that all other agents will produce. Given this
optimistic belief, if ¸
H > c holds, then it is indeed optimal for every agent to produce, and hence
there is an equilibrium with r equal to unity. Note that we have °i = °¤ for all agents i that engage
in production, and hence ° = °¤: The equilibrium value of ¸


















holds, so that the expression for ¸
H simplifies to
¸













The optimistic equilibrium exists whenever this expression is greater than the expected cost of
producing. Now suppose that each agent believes that no other agent will produce. Given this
pessimistic belief, not producing is optimal if ¸
L < c holds, in which case there is an equilibrium
11with r equal to zero. The equilibrium value of ¸
L does not depend on °¤ (since if no other agent
produces there is no reason to search for a buyer), and is given by ¾F: Therefore the pessimistic
equilibrium exists if ¾F < c holds.
Example: For our example (with the parameter values given above), we have
¸
H = 3:25; c = 2:8; ¸
L = 2:5:
Clearly both equilibria exist. ¤
3.2 Equilibrium with an Active Government
Ifthegovernmentdecidestohaveallpublicagentsproduce,thentotalgovernmentemploymentwill
be Ã and aggregate employment can never fall below this. A private agent who decides to produce
still faces the maximization problem given in (2), and hence will choose °i according to (4). The
governmentpolicy affectsthischoicethroughitseffecton½:Weassumethatthegovernmentpolicy
is fixed and known, but as before an agent’s beliefs about the actions of other private agents are
critical. Again we will consider only symmetric outcomes, so that either no private agents produce
or all private agents produce. We begin with the case of pessimistic beliefs.
Pessimistic Beliefs: If no private agents produce, total employment is Ã and total search intensity
is ° = Ã°G: In deciding whether to produce or not, a private agent looks at the probability of






The next lemma shows that as long as the public sector is not too big, the optimal search effort of







8 Note that the public-employment policy guarantees that ½ will be positive, even ifno private agents produce. Then,
since there is no fixed cost of searching, an agent who produces will necessarily choose a positive level of °:









Proof: See appendix. ¥
















where the values of ½ and °¤



















holds, then the policy has eliminated the bad equilibrium and all agents will engage in production.










holds, further increases in effort decrease ½ (due to the crowding-out effect). Hence it may be the
case the no level of government effort can eliminate the bad equilibrium. However, as we show in
the next section, by changing ¸
L the government may be able to decrease the likelihood of the bad
equilibrium even if it cannot eliminate it.




0:6325: We choose Ã = 1
2 as a base. Figure 3 plots °¤ as a function of °G. Initially °¤ is increasing
in°G:As°G increasesfurther, theeconomy movesintothenegativeexternality regionand°¤ starts
to decrease. The value of producing under pessimistic beliefs ¸
L is given by
¸
L = ¾F + a°
2:












L as°G varies. Thevalueof¸
L isinitially increasingin°G;butbecomesdecreasing
in the negative externality region. Notice that for this example, no value of °G raises ¸
L above c;
so that it is not possible for this policy to eliminate the bad equilibrium. If instead we increase F
to 5:59; the picture becomes that in figure 5. Here the policy can eliminate the bad equilibrium
if °G is chosen in the appropriate range. Notice, however, the small range of the horizontal axis.
Only for carefully chosen parameter values will the policy be able to affect the existence of the bad
equilibrium. ¤
Optimistic Beliefs: Evenif the government knew that all private agentsheldoptimistic beliefsand
would produce, it might still want to use °G as a policy tool to offset the externalities involved in
output market search. Private agents still take the value of ½ as given and choose °¤
i according to






but this may be very strong. The proof would proceed exactly as in the previous lemma, but with
Ã set equal to one.
Define b ° to be the average level of search intensity
b ° = (1 ¡ Ã)°
¤ + Ã°
G:















































This expression tells us that public employment only changes ¸
H through its effect on the equilib-
rium value of °¤. Since the government has some control over b °, it can use °G to influence ½ and
hence the value to private agents of producing.
Example: Plotting°¤ asafunctionof°G under optimisticbeliefsyieldsfigure6. Notethescaleof
thehorizontalaxis. Highvaluesof°G discouragesearcheffortunderoptimisticbeliefsmuchsooner
than under pessimistic beliefs. This is because when private agents are produing and searching, the









for F = 5:59
economy enters the negative externality region of the matching function more quickly. Hence the
value of °G that maximizes ¸
H will be much lower than the value that maximizes ¸
L: This can be
seen in figure 7, which graphs ¸
H as a function of °G: The value of ¸
H is initially increasing in °G;
an indication that when public agents are not searching the economy is in the positive externality
region of ¹: The value of °G that maximizes ¸
H is approximately 0:75 ´ b °
G: Note that this is
below the equilibrium search level with a passive government; this indicates that the laissez-faire
economy is in the negative externality region. As °G increases past b °
G, the economy enters the
negative externality region and ¸
H starts to fall. If the government agents search enough, the
optimistic equilibrium can be eliminated. ¤
In summary, this type of demand management policy changes the value of producing under
both pessimistic and optimistic beliefs. It may be possible for the government to use this policy to
eliminate the bad equilibrium. For our chosen parameter values, however, it is not. What value of
°G shouldthe government set? The model does not givea clear answer, but there is one compelling
candidate. Since °G does not affect the value of the bad equilibrium (which is always zero), it
might seem reasonable to set °G = b °
G and maximize the value to private agents of being in the
good equilibrium. The problem with this reasoning is that, as we shall see below, °G affects the
likelihood that the economy will reach the good equilibrium through learning and that from this
point of view b °
G is a bad choice. Before we present our analysis of learning, however, we briefly
discuss optimal allocations in this model.













Becauseof theexternalitiesintheoutput market, decentralizedequilibriainthemodel withoutgov-
ernmentinterventionareunlikely tobeoptimal. Wenowattempttocharacterizeoptimalallocations
inthiseconomy. The social planner first choosesr;thefractionof agentsthat engage in production.
To minimize on notation, we will arrange the names of agents so that those in [0;r) have produced
and those in [r;1) have not. The planner then picks an intensity level °i for each agent (although it
is clear that °i will be set to zero for any agent that did not produce). The entire planning problem




























°i ¸ 0 for all i
0 · r · 1:
Note that the formulation of this problem allows the planner to choose different values of °i for
different producing agents. However, since the value of ¹ depends on the average °i while the
search cost is convex in °i; it is never optimal to do this. This is proven in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 The solution to (8) has °i = ° for all i 2 [0;r):
Proof: See appendix. ¥















(1 ¡ ¾)¹(r°)F ¡ a°
2¢
+ r(¾F ¡ c)
subject to (9)
° ¸ 0; 0 · r · 1:
Note that for any (positive) value of r; ° will be chosen to maximize
(1 ¡ ¾)¹(r°)F ¡ a°
2:
Since this expression is zero when ° is zero, the optimal value of this expression will be nonneg-
ative. Hence, when ° is chosen optimally the first term in the objective function is nondecreasing




= r((1 ¡ ¾)¹









The first derivative is always zero at ° = 0: For small enough values of r; the second derivative is
negative at zero. Furthermore, as ° increases, ¹00 decreases until it is negative (and then remains
negative), so that the second derivative is negative for all values of °: Hence ° = 0 would be the






The expected cost of production is high enough that it cannot be optimal to have any agent produce
and then not engage in search. Hence any value of r satisfying (10) cannot be an optimal choice.
For higher values of r; the next lemma shows that there is a unique interior solution to the first-
order condition, and that it gives the optimal value of °:
Lemma 6 There is a unique interior solution to the equation
(1 ¡ ¾)¹
0 (r°)rF = 2a°;
and this value of ° solves problem (9).
Proof: See appendix. ¥
It is helpful to rewrite the equation defining the optimal value of ° (which we denote by °o) as
°
o =
(1 ¡ a)¹0 (r°o)rF
2a
: (11)
It is interesting to compare this to (5), which defines the (interior) equilibrium value of °. They
differ only in that the optimal ° depends on the marginal product of ° in increasing ¹ whereas the
equilibrium° dependsontheaverageproduct. Hencetheequilibriumisunlikely tobeoptimal, and
may involve either too little or too much search effort. For low values of ° the marginal product is
above the average and hence the equilibrium amount of search effort will tend to be too low. This
is the case of a positive trade externality: additional search effort by some agents will make the
efforts of other agents more productive. For high values of °; however, the marginal product falls
below the average. In this case there is a negative trade externality, or a congestion (crowding-out)
effect. The equilibrium level of search intensity will be too high in this case.
Example: Figure 8 demonstrates the relationship between the optimal and equilibrium levels of
search effort for our chosen parameter values. The intersection of the 45-degree line with the solid
curvegivestheoptimal°;whileitsintersectionwiththedashedcurvegivestheequilibrium° witha
passive government. The graph confirms that this particular economy is in the negative externality
19region. ¤







Figure 8: Equilibrium and optimal levels of °
In principle, the function °(r) implicitly defined in (11) should be substituted into the objec-
tive function, which would then be maximized with respect to r: This seems to be analytically
intractable, so we turn to our example.













+ r(¾F ¡ c):









for high enough values of r: Let V (r) denote the value of the objective function when ° is given by
(12). We use the parameter values from above. In this case, °(r) is zero for r less than 1 p
5 ¼ 0:447:
Figure9plotstheobjectiveasafunctionofr abovethisvalue. Itisclearthatinthiscaser = 1isthe
optimal choice. Note that having a relatively low number of agents producing is worse than having
no agents producing, that is, it yields a value below zero. The optimal value of ° from equation
(12) is approximately 1:1118; which is below the equilibrium value of approximately 1:2248. This
again verifies that the economy with passive policy is in the negative externality region. If we
reduce F to 4, the picture changes to that in figure 10. In this case r = 1 is still better than any
other positive value of r; but now the value of the objective function is negative at this point, so







Figure 9: V (r) when F = 5
that r = 0 is the optimal choice.
This example has the property that the optimal plan has either all agents producing or no agents
producing. We do not know if it is possible to construct examples where the optimal choice of r is
interior. ¤
4. Learning
The existence of multiple equilibria brings up the difficult issue of equilibrium selection. Several
different criteria for selecting among multiple rational expectations equilibria have been proposed
in the literature. Some of these criteria are axiomatic, in the sense that they select equilibria that
possess certain properties. Perhaps the best known of these is the ‘‘minimum state variable’’ crite-
rion of McCallum [11] , which involves simply ignoring equilibria in which extrinsic uncertainty
has real effects. Another possibility is to select Pareto optimal equilibria. This latter approach is
clearly inappropriate for our analysis, since it rules out by assumption equilibrium explanations of
coordination failures, the very phenomenon we study. In addition, Guesnerie and Woodford [6]
show that such purely formal criteria often have undesirable properties, such as failing to exist or
lacking upper hemi-continuity in model parameters.
The other main class of selection criteria involves examining the stability of each equilibrium
withrespecttosomedynamicprocess. Thisprocessistypically interpretedasoneofagentslearning
aboutsomeparametersof theeconomy. Thisistheapproachwetake. Theliteratureonlearninghas









Figure 10: V (r) when F = 4
focused primarily on (i) whether or not learning converges to a rational expectations equilibrium
and(ii) whether particular equilibria arestable or unstablewithrespect to a given learning process.
It is easy to show that in our model (i) is not a concern; learning always converges to one of
the equilibria studied above. Which equilibrium the economy converges to depends on the actual
sequence of realizations of uncertainty, and hence is random. We take issue (ii) a step further
than the previous literature by studying the properties of the probability distribution over the set of
equilibria induced by Bayesian learning.
Lucas [10] , in a discussion on the use of ‘‘rationality’’ in economic theory, suggests that rational
expectations equilibria can often be ‘‘interpreted as a description of a kind of stationary ‘point’ of
[a] dynamic, adaptive process.’’ We follow Lucas’ approach in the sense that we use the learning
scheme to investigate the plausibility of the different possible equilibria.
9 But we go a step further
in that we study the probability distribution over the set of equilibria that is induced by an specific
adaptive behavior mechanism.
Thereisalwaysadegreeofarbitrarinessintheselectionofalearningrule,andourspecificresults
clearly depend on the rule that we employ. Nevertheless, we think that our adaptive mechanism
is not completely arbitrary. First, it is well known that expected utility maximizers use Bayes rule
to update beliefs (see Blume and Easley [2] ). Second, we assume that agents begin with diffuse
priors, whichseemstobeareasonable assumptioninlargeeconomies(‘‘onaverage’’). Thereisstill
9 To use the adaptive behavior to predict macroeconomic performance along the learning transition does not consti-
tute, for Lucas, ‘‘a serious hypothesis.’’ For example, the initial date of any data set being studied is not the t = 0 of
the theoretical model in any behavioral sense.
22some nonrationality in our assumptionsabout agent’sbeliefsover the probability distributionof the
randomendogenousvariablesduringthelearningtransition. This, however, couldbejustifiedwith
aboundedrationality argument(seeGuesnerieandWoodford[6]). Finally,thisapproachrepresents
a starting point for our analysis of probabilistic equilibrium selection, and we plan to address other
approaches in future work.
Let us consider the problem faced by an agent at the outset of the economy (this could be inter-
preted as the problem faced by agents after a radical structural change in the economy). Assume
that, without any additional inference about the economy, the agents are able to compute the value
of producing when every other agent produces, ¸
H, and the value when no other private agents
produce, ¸
L, and that they know the two possible values that c can take: cH and cL.
However, let us also assume that agents do not know the true probability distribution associated
tothetworelevantrandomvariablesintheenvironment: thecostc andtheotheragents’ production
decisions r. We want to consider the implications of ‘‘rational’’ learning for the plausibility of
the different possible final equilibria (after the learning process has converged). We assume that
agents update beliefs using Bayes rule. As is usual in the learning literature, though, some extra
assumptionsaboutthepriordistributionsarenecessary tobeabletoproceed. Theseassumptionsare
mainly directedathavingthedistributionof prior beliefsbeamember of thesameconjugatefamily
of distributions as the final (after convergence) probability distributions underlying the economy.
10
We introduce the following three assumptions. First, we assume that every agent believes that
all other private agents in the economy will act identically, either producing or not producing. As
a result of this, the support of the random variables subject to learning are fixed and known. They
both have only two elements: c 2 fcH;cLg; and r 2 f1;Ãg. The learning problem consists of
figuring out the following two probabilities
p ´ Pr(ct = c
L)
q ´ Pr(rt = 1):
Second, we assume that agents believe that these probabilities are constant. This is not true
during the transition, while learning is taking place, for the case of q. The variable r is an endoge-
10 Note that since r is an endogenous variable, the true final distribution depends also on what happens during the
transitional period.
23nous variable in the model that shows, for example, a strong autocorrelation during the transitional
period. However, as the economy converges to a rational expectations equilibrium, this belief
becomes eventually correct. We can interpret this assumption as part of a bounded rationality lim-
itation on the part of the agents. As will become clear, the realization of the stochastic process
for r during the transition can actually show a very complicated pattern, not necessarily appearing
incompatible with the simple (although incorrect) belief held by agents.
Third,weassumethateachagenthasidenticalbeliefsandthatthey startthelearningprocesswith
independent diffuse priors over the values of p and q. That is, their beliefs are initially represented
by a uniform distribution on [0;1] for each of the probabilities.
Let (pt;qt) denote the expected value of (p;q) according to the beliefs held by the agents at date
t. In particular, we have p0 = q0 = 1
2. In each iteration of the learning algorithm, the observation
of (ct;rt) provides useful information for updating (pt;qt). Bayesian updating of beliefs allows us
to write the expected value of the parameter of the distributions after t iterations as
pt+1 = ´pt if ct = c
H
pt+1 = ´pt + (1 ¡ ´) if ct = c
L
and
qt+1 = ´qt + (1 ¡ ´) if rt = 1
qt+1 = ´qt if rt = Ã
where ´ = (t+2)=(t+3).
11 The agent’s expected utility based on the beliefs held at the beginning
of time t are given by
u(pt;qt) = qt¸




L + (1 ¡ pt)c
H¤
and the agent will decide to produce if and only if u(pt;qt) > 0.
As in Howitt and McAfee [7] , we can represent the learning process in (p;q) space as in figure
11 This updating rule is a special case of the following recursive algorithm for estimating the mean of the distribution
of x: xe
t+1 = xe
t + ®t (xt ¡ xe
t); where xe
t is the estimation, xt is the period-t realization and f®tg is a decreasing
sequence ofpositive numbersthat approaches zeroas t goes toinfinity (see Guesnerie and Woodford[6]). In our case,
xt has a Bernoulli distribution and ®t = 1=(t + 3). It is not hard to show that when instead ®t = 1=t the recursive
algorithm uses the sample mean as the relevant statistic.
2411. The box in the figure represents the set of possible beliefs. A point in the box, such a as point
Figure 11: Dynamics of beliefs
a, corresponds to a particular value of (pt;qt): If the point falls in the region P; where the expected
profit from producing is positive, all agents will produce and hence the value of q will increase.
Howitt and McAfee [7] show that posterior beliefs always lie on the line segment connecting the
prior beliefs with one of the corners of the box. From point a we would move to b if cH is observed
and to c if cL is observed. Similarly, if the original point is x; then expected profits are negative,
no agents will produce, and q will decrease. We move to point y if cH is observed and to z if cL is
observed.
Bayesian updating consistently estimates the value of p; i.e. pt ! p as t ! 1; and hence
the learning process must converge to (p;q) equal to either (p;0) or (p;1): Define ¼ to be the
probability that qt ! 1 as t ! 1. It is easy to see that cL < ¸
L < c < ¸
H < cH implies that
we have 0 < ¼ < 1. Hence the adaptive learning process induces a probability distribution over
the two equilibria to which it can converge. We now examine how the government policies in the
previous section influence ¼ and hence the likelihood of each equilibrium. The analytics of this






generated by some °G
Example: Wehaveshownabovethatforourparticularparametervalues,thebadequilibriumexists
for all values of °G and hence ¼ is always less that unity. We construct a grid of values for °G, and
for each of these values we compute the resulting ¼ through simulation.
12 It is straightforward to
calculate ¸
H; the value of the good equilibrium to private agents, for each °G in the grid using the





that are generated by
different possible valuesof the policy parameter. Figure 12 presents a plot of one collection of such
points.
Increases in °G correspond to counterclockwise movements along the arc traced out by these
points. V ery lowvaluesof°G resultinarelatively lowprobability ofattainingthegoodequilibrium.
As °G increases, ¸
H also increases and attains its maximum value at b °
G; while ¼ is simultaneously
increasing. This movement to the northeast on the graph is unambiguously good - the good equi-
librium is becoming both better and more likely. Afterwards, however, a tradeoff sets in. Further
increases in °G continue to increase ¼; making the good equilibrium more and more likely. How-
ever, at the same time the value of the good equilibrium is decreasing. There is a value of °G that
maximizes the probability of reaching the good equilibrium (call it e °
G), but it yields a substantially
lower value of being in this equilibrium than does b °
G: Beyond this point, further increases in °G
12 Thecomputationspresentedherearepreliminaryandmorerobustnesschecksneedtobeperformed. Allsimulations
were done in FORTRAN; the code is available upon request.
26are unambiguously bad - they decrease both ¸
H and ¼:










space. One can then ask which of these policies is optimal. The answer, of course, depends on the
preferences of the policymaker in this space. Since ¸
H is measured in utility terms, one candidate
objective would be to maximize expected utility across equilibria, that is, to maximize
¼¸
H + (1 ¡ ¼)0
= ¼¸
H:
Since private agents do not produce in the bad equilibrium, the utility value of that equilibrium is
zero. Preferences such as these would generate indifference curves that are convex to the origin
and hence would select a policy strictly between b °
G and e °
G:
Recall that before we considered learning, b °
G seemed like an obvious candidate for the optimal
policy. There is no way to eliminate the bad equilibrium, and at leave this policy maximizes the
value of being in the good equilibrium. Using learning to do probabilistic equilibrium selection,
however,changesthewaywethinkaboutoptimalpolicyinthisexample,andleadstotheconclusion
that we should select a higher value of °G: 2
5. Concluding Remarks
Our goal in this paper has been to show that using adaptive learning to generate a probability distri-
bution over the set of equilibria can lead to useful and interesting results. In particular, this type of
analysisprovides aunique answer tooptimal policy questions, andfor our examplethisanswer dif-
fers from that which would be generated by any deterministic selection criterion. We have framed
our analysis in terms of a particular model and a particular learning rule, but we believe that these
ideas apply much more broadly and we plan to extend this analysis in future work. We conclude
here by offering a brief discussion of three issues that we plan to address.
The type of model we study here also possesses sunspot equilibria, as shown by Howitt and
McAfee [7] . Suppose that at the beginning of each period, one of two extrinsic states of nature is
revealed; eitherthereissunspotactivity thatperiodorthereisnot. Ifagentsareallowedtocondition
their beliefs about the actions of others on this random variable, then there exist equilibria where
27all agents’ production decisions depend on the realization of the sunspot variable. These equilibria
are necessarily randomizations over the certainty equilibria of the model,
13 and hence our analysis
is easily extended to this case. If we assume that agent’s prior beliefs are independent across states,
thentheprobability ¼ iscomputedexactly asabove. Theprobability ofgettingthegoodequilibrium
in both sunspot states is then ¼2; while the bad equilibrium in both states comes with probability
(1 ¡ ¼)
2:Theeconomy convergestoasunspotequilibriumwithprobability 2¼ (1 ¡ ¼):Oneinter-
esting thing thatcomesfromthisanalysisisthat theprobability of reachingasunspotequilibriumis
maximized when ¼ is equal to one-half, or when there is the greatest uncertainty about the eventual
outcome. In other words, when the economy can go either way, it may go both ways.
Another obvious extension of the above analysis is to other types of government policies in
this same model. Instead of using the demand-management policy studied here, the government
could affect the value of producing by taxing or subsidizing search effort in order to correct for the
marketexternality. Suchapolicy will havenoeffecton¸
L;but it willaffect¸
H andthroughthisthe
probability ¼: In our example, it is possible to show that there is a unique tax rate that maximizes
the value ¸
H: Whether or not the same type of tradeoff between maximizing ¸
H and maximizing ¼
arises under this policy as does under the demand-management policy discussed above remains to
beseen. Afinalextensionoftheanalysisthatwefindpromisingistolabormarketissues. Onecould
imagine changing the model so that workers and firms need to be matched in order for production
to occur,
14 and that the government has a policy that affects the efficiency of this matching process.
Optimal policy analysis using probabilistic equilibrium selection could then be done with respect
to a braod range of labor market policies.
13 In a richer model where there is a way for at least some agents to transfer wealth across sunspot states, sunspot
equilibria are typically not randomizations over the certainty equilibria of the model. See Cass and Shell [3] .
14 This is in the spirit of Howitt and McAfee[7] .
28Appendix A. Proofs of Lemmas







Proof: This value of °¤
i is that given by the first-order condition for an interior solution. Hence
it is the solution to the problem as long as it satisfies the inequality constraint. In equilibrium we
have °i = ° for all i, ° = r°; and ½(°;r) = ¹(r°)=°: Our assumptions on ¹ include ¹(r°) < 1;









Hence the constraint is not binding at the equilibrium value of ½: ¥
































00 (0) > 1;
where the inequality follows from (A7): Hence the right-hand side starts out above the left-hand
side. The limit as ° goes to infinity of the right-hand side is zero (since ¹ is bounded), so by
continuity there is at least one interior solution.











for x > e x:
This implies that the right-hand side is increasing up to r° = e x and then decreasing afterwards.



















We first need to evaluate this at ° = 0:
lim
°!0g


































which is negative by (A8): Hence the right-hand side is initially concave. As ° increases, the
¹00 term in A-1 falls, while (A6) implies that the difference between the marginal and the average
product of ¹ increases until r° = x: This keeps the expression for g00 negative until at least x: After
x; ¹00 becomes negative, so that g00 is negative until at least e x; where the marginal and average
products of ¹ cross.
This establishes that g is a concave function on (0;e x): Recall that g is decreasing after e x: To-
gether these facts imply that g can cross the 45-degree line only once, or that the solution to (5)
must be unique. ¥
Lemma 5: The solution to (8) has °i = ° for all i 2 [0;r):




















Suppose that it is not the case that °i = ° for almost all i 2 [0;r) and consider the alternative plan







so that the value of the first term in the objective function is the same under the two policies.
To evaluate the second term, consider the problem of minimizing the integral of °2
i subject to the
constraintthattheintegralof°i isequaltosomeconstant(inthiscase°r). Thefirst-ordernecessary












and hence the value of the second term is lower under the new policy, contradicting the optimality
of the original policy. ¥
Lemma 6: There is a unique interior solution to the equation
(1 ¡ ¾)¹
0 (r°)rF = 2a°;
and this value of ° solves problem (9).
Proof: Both sides of the equation start at the origin, and condition (A7) guarantees that the right-
handsideinitially increasesfaster thanthe left-handside. Since¹0 goestozeroas° goestoinfinity,
the left-hand side is eventually larger and by continuity there is at least one solution.
Let ° be the lowest (positive) value of ° that satisfies the equation. Since the right-hand side is
crossing (or at least touching) the left-hand side from above, its slope must be no greater than that
of the left-hand side, i.e., we must have
(1 ¡ ¾)¹
00 (r°)F · 2a:
31Conditions (A6) and (A8) then imply that we have
(1 ¡ ¾)¹
00 (r°)F < 2a
for all ° > °; since ¹00 is decreasing up to x and negative thereafter. Hence the slope of the right-
hand side is less than that of the left-hand side for all ° > °: This implies that (i) the two curves
cross at ° (and are not just tangent) and (ii) the two curves do not cross again. This demonstrates
that there is a unique interior solution to the first-order condition.
Since the first-order condition is a necessary condition for an interior solution, the solution to
the maximization problem must either be zero or °: Since the objective function is increasing in °









































This demonstrates that the interior solution satisfies the constraint. ¥
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